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A growing body of evidence is reviewed showing that degree of handedness (consistent
versus inconsistent) is a more powerful and appropriate way to classify handedness than
the traditional one based on direction (right versus left). Experimental studies from the
domains of episodic memory retrieval, belief updating/cognitive flexibility, risk perception,
and more are described.These results suggest that inconsistent handedness is associated
with increased interhemispheric interaction and increased access to processes localized
to the right cerebral hemisphere.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychological research examining “individual differences”
grounded in biology (in contrast with, for example, personal-
ity/temperament, or in experience) typically focuses on sex and
age. Another biologically based dimension of individual differ-
ences, handedness, has received much less attention. This neglect
has arisen in part because handedness research has largely been
the province of neuropsychologists, and such research makes little
contact with the methods and theories of mainstream psychology.
This lack of contact is the product of both the idiosyncratic meth-
ods employed in handedness research (e.g., lateralized presenta-
tion of input), and the fact that, historically, research attempting
to identify key functional and structural differences between left-
and right-handers has produced equivocal results (other than the
fact that brain asymmetry appears to be weaker and more variable
in left-handers).
The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader with a
growing body of evidence identifying handedness as a robust pre-
dictor of individual differences across a number of domains. The
research to be reviewed breaks with past handedness research in a
critical way: instead of comparing left- versus right-handedness, it
focuses on comparisons between consistent/strong-handers (CH)
and inconsistent/mixed-handers (ICH). Here, we define CH as
using the dominant hand for virtually all common manual activ-
ities, and ICH as using the non-dominant hand for at least one
common manual activity. That is, historically, research examin-
ing individual differences in handedness focused on the effects of
direction of hand preference on behavior, thereby comparing left
versus right-handers. However, evidence has accumulated that the
critical dimension on which the handedness groups differ is in
degree (consistent versus inconsistent) of hand preference. That
is, how consistently, or strongly, an individual prefers to use one
versus the other hand over a wide variety of tasks may be the more
appropriate indicator of cerebral organization and of behavior.
In fact, we would argue here that a major reason why previous
research has failed to clearly determine individual differences in
handedness effects on behavior is because the measure used to
define handedness has heretofore been incorrect. Instead of direc-
tion of hand preference being the variable of interest, it should be
degree.
The distinction between consistent and inconsistent handed-
ness is based on a simple median split on scores on the Edin-
burgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Scores range from
−100 (pure left handed) to +100 (pure right-handed). The
population median, based on a large sample of 1595 subjects,
is 80. Thus, inconsistent handedness is defined as handedness
scores below 80, which is equivalent to performing at least one
of the ten activities with the non-dominant hand. A summary
of the population proportions of handedness is presented in
Table 1.
There are two things to note about Table 1. First, right-handers
tend to be consistent handed while left-handers are largely incon-
sistent handed. Second, consistent handedness is more prevalent
among females than among males.
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully expli-
cate the mechanisms underlying the distinction between CH and
ICH, key principles involve interhemispheric communication and
functional access to right hemisphere processing. More consistent
hand preference is associated with smaller corpus callosum size
(e.g., Luders et al., 2010) and with decreased right hemisphere
activation (e.g., Propper et al., 2012). Accordingly, consistent-
versus inconsistent handedness is associated with decreased ver-
sus increased interhemispheric interaction and with decreased
versus increased right hemisphere access, respectively. The follow-
ing review will focus primarily on two task domains for which
interhemispheric interaction and right hemisphere access have
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Table 1 | Percentages of female and male participants, classified
according to both direction and degree of handedness.
Direction of handedness Degree of handedness
Strong Mixed
FEMALES
Right 59.3 31.0 90.3
Left 3.2 6.5 9.7
62.5 37.5
MALES
Right 47.8 41.6 89.4
Left 2.4 8.2 10.6
50.2 49.8
been implicated: episodic memory retrieval (associated with right
frontal areas) and belief updating/cognitive flexibility (associ-
ated with right frontal-parietal areas), with the evidence showing
that ICH exhibit superior episodic memory and increased belief
updating/cognitive flexibility. Other related findings will also be
presented. A summary of the findings reviewed is provided in
Table 2.
We are not arguing that the reader should become a “handed-
ness”researcher. Instead, we are encouraging researchers to include
degree of handedness as a variable in their designs, much like many
already do with sex and/or age. At the very least, including hand-
edness as a variable in analyses would move variability out of the
omnibus error term and into a specific effect term, thereby provid-
ing increased statistical power to detect other effects of primary
interest. At best, systematic individual differences as a function
of handedness and concomitant gradations in interhemispheric
interaction and in right hemisphere access, could prove to be a use-
ful construct in the development and testing of domain-specific
theories.
HANDEDNESS AND MEMORY
Some of the most robust findings demonstrating the effects of
handedness as an individual difference variable come from the
domain of memory research. This work initially relied on pre-
dictions made by the Hemispheric Encoding and Retrieval and
Asymmetry (HERA) model (Tulving et al., 1994). They reported
that, for semantic memory tasks, brain activity at both encoding
and retrieval were lateralized to the left hemisphere. In contrast, for
episodic memory, activation at encoding versus retrieval was later-
alized to the left versus right hemispheres, respectively. This finding
raised the possibility that (i) episodic memory relies on interhemi-
spheric interaction (necessary to integrate left hemisphere encod-
ing with right hemisphere retrieval) to a greater extent than does
semantic memory (left hemisphere encoding and retrieval); (ii)
individual differences in interhemispheric interaction would be
reflected in individual differences in memory ability, and (iii) indi-
vidual differences in degree of hand preference, being associated
with individual differences in interhemispheric interaction, would
therefore also be associated with individual differences in memory
performance. Specifically, inconsistently handed individuals, hav-
ing increased interhemispheric interaction, possibly mediated via
Table 2 | Summary of research on handedness differences in memory.
Task Findings Citation
Free recall of words ICH advantage Propper et al. (2005)
Free recall of words ICH advantage Lyle et al. (2008a)
Free recall of words ICH advantage Christman and Butler
(2011)
Free recall of events from
own life
ICH advantage Propper et al. (2005)
Recall of early childhood
memories
ICH advantage Christman et al. (2006b)
Paired-associate recall ICH advantage Lyle et al. (2008b)
Source memory (DRM
paradigm)
ICH advantage Christman et al. (2004)
Source memory (sensory
modality)
ICH advantage Lyle et al. (2008b)
Self-reported everyday
memory
ICH advantage Christman and Propper
(2008)
Self-reported dream recall ICH advantage Christman (2007)
Incidental memory for
deeply processed words
ICH advantage Christman and Butler
(2011)
Incidental memory for
shallowly processed words
No difference Christman and Butler
(2011)
Know versus remember
judgments
ICH: rem> know
CH: rem= know
Propper and Christman
(2004)
Word recognition No difference Propper and Christman
(2004)
Word recognition No difference Lyle et al. (2008a)
Face memory ICH advantage Lyle and Orsborn (2011)
Implicit memory No difference Propper et al. (2005)
Semantic memory No difference Propper et al. (2005)
Memory for paragraphs ICH advantage Prichard and Christman
(2012)
Openness to persuasion ICH more open Christman et al. (2008)
Gullibility ICH more gullible Christman et al. (2008)
Belief in evolution ICH more likely Niebauer et al. (2004)
Magical ideation ICH have higher
levels
Barnett and Corballis
(2002)
Cognitive dissonance ICH have higher
levels
Jasper et al. (2009)
Placebo effect Larger in ICH Christman et al. (2006a)
Anchoring effect Larger in ICH Jasper and Christman
(2005)
Counterfactuals ICH produce
more
Jasper et al. (2008)
Ambiguous figures ICH higher
reversal rate
Christman et al. (2009)
Ambiguous words Greater activation
in ICH
Sontam and Christman
(2012)
Musical preferences Greater
preference for
obscure genres in
ICH
Christman (2013)
Sensation seeking Higher levels in
ICH
Christman (2011a)
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Task Findings Citation
Consumer loyalty Lower levels in
ICH
Lanning and Christman
(2010)
Right Wing
Authoritarianism
Lower levels in
ICH
Christman (2008)
Sense of disgust Stronger in CH Christman (2012)
Risk perception ICH more loss
averse
Christman et al. (2007b)
Sunk cost effect Higher levels in
ICH
Westfall et al. (2012)
Taking others’ perspectives ICH are better Sontam et al. (2005);
Lanning and Christman
(2010)
Sleep architecture ICH: shorter
latency, increased
time in NREM
Propper et al. (2007)
ICH, inconsistent handed; CH, consistent handed.
greater corpus callosal connectivity, would demonstrate superior
episodic, but not semantic, memory.
Supporting the hypothesis, Propper et al. (2005) found that
ICH outperformed CH on an episodic memory task involving
word list recall. Interestingly, there was no significant difference
between the handedness groups on a word fragment completion
task used as a test of semantic memory. Handedness differences are
not typically found in recognition memory; however, in another
test of episodic memory (e.g., Christman and Propper, 2001),
Propper and Christman (2004) found that, despite equal levels
of recognition memory, ICH are more likely to report explicitly
episodically “remembering” an item while CH are more likely
to report merely semantically “knowing” that they saw the item
before.
The findings that ICH have superior episodic recall abilities
and show a greater tendency than CH to make “remember” judg-
ments raises the possibility that handedness differences in episodic
memory may reflect underlying differences in source memory.
Three findings examining handedness differences in false alarms,
using both laboratory based and real-world memories, support
this notion. First, Christman et al. (2004) demonstrated that ICH
are less likely to report having a false memory for the critical lure
in by the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm, suggest-
ing that the source of memories may be more available in the
ICH relative the CH. Second, Lyle et al. (2008b) tested source
memory for words that participants had originally either read
or heard; again, relative to CH, ICH were better at remember-
ing whether the original presentation of items has been visual or
auditory. Finally, Lyle et al. (2008a) also reported fewer false alarms
in ICH.
These “snapshot” handedness effects on memory-that is, of
superior episodic memory among ICH relative to CH− have been
extended in investigations of handedness and memory effects
across the lifespan. Christman et al. (2006b) reported that ICH
experience an earlier offset of childhood amnesia, and therefore a
younger age for their earliest childhood memory. Lyle et al. (2008b)
obtained an ICH advantage on a recall task in a sample of mid-
dle aged adults, but not with a sample of older adults. Lyle et al.
(2008b) proposed that as people age, the corpus callosum degener-
ates, thus attenuating the ICH advantage. Specifically, the decline
in memory from middle- to older-aged adults was larger in the
ICH, consistent with a callosal contribution to episodic memory.
Finally,Kempe et al. (2009) found that ICH were more easily able to
acquire foreign vocabulary words in adulthood. Although vocab-
ulary recall in adulthood may involve both episodic and semantic
memory processes, this finding suggests that individual differ-
ences in handedness may account for some between individual
variability in language acquisition.
Findings of superior episodic memory in ICH relative the CH
extend beyond artificial, laboratory information. For example,
Propper et al. (2005) demonstrated an ICH advantage for auto-
biographical, self-reported events that occurred outside the labo-
ratory, and Christman et al. (2006b) reported an ICH advantage
for earliest childhood memories. Christman and Propper (2008)
found that ICH reported fewer memory problems in everyday life,
especially in the domains of task monitoring and conversation.
Christman (2007) reported that ICH remember more dreams and
report more frequent déjà vu experiences. Prichard and Christ-
man (2012) found that the ICH advantage in memory extends
to recall of paragraph-level material, although the ICH advantage
was larger for males than for females. Finally, Lyle and Orsborn
(2011) reported superior face memory in ICH.
It is important to point out that in the studies reviewed above,
most compared ICH with consistent right -handers. Given that
consistent-left-handers are only about 1–3% of the population
(Lansky et al., 1988), studies comparing ICH with consistently
right and consistently left handed individuals are time consum-
ing, difficult to conduct, and therefore infrequent. However, Lyle
et al. (2012) collected a large sample of consistent-left-handers in
order to determine whether it is consistent handedness per se that
is associated with less or episodic memory, or if this effect is specific
to consistent-right -handedness. Importantly, ICH outperformed
CH, on an episodic memory task, regardless of the direction of CH
hand preference; that is, regardless of whether CH were left- or
right-handed, ICH performed better.
HANDEDNESS AND BELIEF UPDATING/COGNITIVE
FLEXIBILITY
Ramachandran (1995) hypothesized that the left hemisphere is
important for maintaining our current beliefs about the world,
while the right hemisphere acts as an anomaly detector and is
sensitive to information inconsistent with those beliefs. This sug-
gests a possible role for interhemispheric connectivity in the belief
updating process. When something challenges pre-existing beliefs,
it may be the right hemisphere’s job to notice the inconsistency
and communicate it to the left hemisphere. Since belief updating
may be considered, more broadly, an example of cognitive flex-
ibility, further studies have also looked at numerous DVs which,
taken together, may be considered measures of cognitive flexibility.
It is to the literature investigating a possible relationship between
handedness and belief updating/cognitive flexibility which we now
turn.
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Niebauer et al. (2004) found that consistent-handers are more
likely to report holding young-earth creationist beliefs. The
authors argued that, because children typically hold creationist
views at some point (Evans, 2000), the retention of such beliefs
is the result of a failure to update beliefs about human origins in
light of new evidence. Similarly, Christman et al. (2008) reported
that ICH are more open to persuasion. At the same time, however,
they found that ICH were also more gullible, showing greater sus-
ceptibility to the “Barnum effect.” This finding may be related to
that of Barnett and Corballis (2002), who reported that ICH were
more prone to magical ideation (i.e., beliefs in ESP, UFOs, astrol-
ogy, etc). Thus, CH are more resistant to belief updating, and are
therefore less likely to alter their views based on little evidence.
Once researchers obtained the basic finding that degree of
handedness predicts the tendency to update one’s beliefs or, to
frame it differently, degree of handedness predicts resistance to
information challenging pre-existing beliefs, the handedness par-
adigm has been applied to several areas for which the belief
updating/cognitive flexibility process is relevant. For example, it
has been applied to cognitive dissonance (Jasper et al., 2009), who
conducted a study in which participants were given false per-
sonality profiles. In the experimental condition, participants were
told their profiles indicated high levels of sexism. When asked to
judge a fictional sex based discrimination suit, ICH who had been
told they were sexist awarded higher payouts than CH, indicat-
ing greater cognitive dissonance in ICH. Handedness differences
have also been obtained in the magnitude of placebo effects, with
ICH exhibiting much larger placebo effects than CH (Christman
et al., 2006a). Thus, handedness may be a variable of interest for
researchers examining how belief affects treatment outcomes, or
for researchers who want to reduce the error term in clinical trials
that necessarily include a placebo condition.
As stated at the beginning of the section, belief updating could
arguably fall under the broader area of cognitive flexibility. The
empirical evidence indicates handedness does indeed predict cog-
nitive flexibility as measured by a surprising variety of DVs.
Starting with research on basic heuristics, Jasper and Christman
(2005) found that inconsistent-handers were less susceptible to
anchoring on a task that asked participants 12 factual knowledge
questions after exposing them to unhelpful high or low anchors.
Resisting anchors in such a situation may require one to hold
multiple representations, a process requiring considerable cog-
nitive flexibility. In the area of counterfactual reasoning, Jasper
et al. (2008) found that, when asked to come up with counterfac-
tual alternatives to various scenarios, ICH produce more upward
counterfactuals and downward counterfactuals. Research on more
basic perceptual processes shows that ICH can more easily update
their perception of ambiguous figures (Christman et al., 2009) and
that ICH more readily fall for a sensory illusion in which a partic-
ipant comes to “feel” taps on a fake arm (Niebauer et al., 2002).
During investigations of semantic flexibility, ICH showed a greater
tendency to switch between subcategories when asked to name as
many animals as they could (Sontam et al., 2009) and had an eas-
ier time accessing “weak” associates of ambiguous stimulus words
than consistent-handers did (Sontam and Christman, 2012). ICH
have also been shown to be more creative, measured via divergent
thinking, compared to CH (Shobe et al., 2009).
As with the handedness and memory paradigms, there has
been an interest in whether these cognitive flexibility effects gen-
eralize beyond the realm of interesting experiments. What does
it mean to say inconsistent-handers are more cognitively flexible
outside of an experimental context? As it turns out, handedness
predicts certain kinds of esthetic judgments, with ICH show-
ing more appreciation for self-referential works by M.C. Escher
(Niebauer and Garvey, 2004) and for a wider variety of musical
genres (Christman, 2013) than CH. Further, consistent-handers
are less sensation seeking (Christman, 2011a), exhibit greater
consumer brand loyalty (Christman and Lanning, 2012), have
greater disgust sensitivity (Christman, 2012), and score higher
on measures of Right Wing Authoritarianism (Christman, 2008)
than ICH.
Perhaps of the greatest practical relevance, the link between
handedness and cognitive flexibility is of potential clinical rel-
evance. Consistent-handers are more likely than inconsistent-
handers to ruminate (Niebauer, 2004), to display eating disorder
symptomatology (Christman et al., 2007a), and to show higher
levels of body dysmorphia (Christman, 2011b).
MISCELLANEOUS HANDEDNESS FINDINGS
While the memory and cognitive flexibility literatures are the most
well developed of the literatures investigating degree of handed-
ness as an individual difference variable, it is worth mentioning
several empirical studies that have branched out beyond these
two major areas. Although much remains to be explained about
what underlies the following findings, it is hoped that there will be
something of interest to researchers from across the discipline of
psychology.
Several studies looking at emotion and risk perception have
uncovered evidence of handedness effects. Propper et al. (2010)
reported that ICH demonstrated increased negative affect across
a wide variety of emotional states, compared to CH, although
only feelings of “anger” were significantly greater in ICH. Christ-
man et al. (2007b) found that, when making risky decisions,
inconsistent-handers reported being more influenced by the per-
ceived risks of a behavior and consistent-handers reported being
more influenced by the perceived benefits. Westfall et al. (2012)
found that inconsistent-handers showed more inaction inertia and
a greater sunk cost effect unless it was made clear that staying on a
particular course would definitely result in a greater loss than aban-
doning it. Once it was clear that inaction would definitely result
in a greater loss, there was a reversal with inconsistent-handers
showing less inaction inertia. Finally, Bhattacharya et al. (2012)
found that selectively activating the right hemisphere via Schiffer
goggles increased the tendency for inconsistent-handers to focus
on risks and consistent-handers to focus on benefits. It may be
that these findings are related to a potential right hemisphere role
in negative affect/withdrawal motivational states.
Handedness has also been used as a variable in traditional
self-other/person perception paradigms. ICH seem to have an eas-
ier time taking other perspectives into account (Sontam et al.,
2005; Lanning and Christman, 2010) and have better memory
for counter-stereotypical information (Christman and Sterling,
2009). Additionally, sex and race effects on the Implicit Associ-
ation Test (IAT) are modulated by handedness (Christman and
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Sahu, 2012). For example, the weakest stereotyping was exhib-
ited by ICH European Americans and by CH African-American
males.
We will wrap up the present review with several additional find-
ings that are not yet part of any broad research program, but which
may prove to be promising leads in the future. While investigating
possible associations between handedness and sleep architecture,
Propper et al. (2004) found that ICH had shorter sleep latency and
spent more time in NREM, although Propper et al. (2007) also
obtained evidence that consistent -left-handers spend more time in
NREM and less time in REM than consistent -right-handers, thus
raising the possibility that both strength and direction of hand-
edness should be considered when researching sleep. Christman
(1993) discovered a compelling example of how degree of handed-
ness may be related to preferences for certain motor tasks when he
surveyed musicians and found that ICH were more likely to play
instruments that require temporally integrated bimanual motor
actions.
In conclusion, the studies reviewed above demonstrate a robust
and systematic effect of degree of handedness in two well defined
domains; episodic memory retrieval and belief updating/cognitive
flexibility, and in other areas as well, including emotion and sleep
architecture. It is hoped that this review will inspire a wider body
of psychology investigators to incorporate this long neglected and
misunderstood dimension of human individual difference into
their research.
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